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We use a new panel data set of credit card accounts to analyze how
consumers responded to the 2001 federal income tax rebates. We
estimate the monthly response of credit card payments, spending, and
debt, exploiting the unique, randomized timing of the rebate dis-
bursement. We find that, on average, consumers initially saved some
of the rebate, by increasing their credit card payments and thereby
paying down debt. But soon afterward their spending increased,
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counter to the permanent income model. Spending rose most for
consumers who were initially most likely to be liquidity constrained,
whereas debt declined most (so saving rose most) for unconstrained
consumers.
I. Introduction
This article uses a unique, new panel data set of thousands of credit
card accounts to analyze how consumers respond to “lumpy” increases
in income such as tax rebates. Specifically, to what extent did consumers
use the 2001 federal income tax rebates to increase spending or to pay
down debt? About two-thirds of U.S. tax filers received the rebates,
typically $600 for couples and $300 for singles, for an average gain of
about $500 per recipient household.1 This represents a historically sig-
nificant tax cut, corresponding to about 5 percent of quarterly median
family income. In aggregate about $38 billion of rebates were disbursed,
which corresponds to about 2 percent of quarterly personal consump-
tion expenditures.2 Our analysis will exploit a key feature of the rebate
disbursement—its randomized timing. The rebate checks were dis-
bursed over 10 successive weeks from July through September 2001,
depending on the second-to-last digit of the recipients’ social security
numbers.3 Because this penultimate digit is randomly assigned, the tim-
ing of rebate receipt represents truly exogenous variation. Such ran-
domization is quite rare in the history of fiscal policy and provides a
unique natural experiment that cleanly identifies the causal effects of
the rebates.
Although our estimation does not depend on any particular economic
model, the results can be interpreted as a novel test of the canonical
life cycle/permanent income (LCPI) model. In particular, in our high-
frequency framework the rebates can be thought of as being prean-
1 The rebates were used to deliver the benefits of reducing the lowest federal income
tax bracket (which applied to the first $12,000 of taxable income for joint returns, the
first $6,000 for individual returns, and the first $10,000 for heads of households) from
15 percent to 10 percent. According to unpublished estimates from the Treasury, about
89.5 million tax returns received a rebate and 23.5 million did not receive a rebate, and
about 22.9 million households did not file and so also did not receive rebates (Office of
Tax Analysis). The average gain at the household level was calculated by Johnson, Parker,
and Souleles (2006) using the Consumer Expenditure Survey.
2 These calculations draw on Shapiro and Slemrod (2003a). The rebates represented
the dominant component (about 84 percent) of the tax cuts implemented in the first
year of the Economic Growth and Tax Relief Reconciliation Act of 2001. The timing of
the remaining, smaller components in 2001 is independent of the randomized timing of
the rebates analyzed here. For more details about the act, see Auerbach (2002), Kiefer
et al. (2002), and Shapiro and Slemrod (2003a, 2003b).
3 Taxpayers who had filed their year 2000 returns late could receive the rebate later
than this, but typically about 92 percent of filers file on time (Slemrod et al. 1997). Our
analysis does not use any variation resulting from late returns.
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nounced: Congress passed the Economic Growth and Tax Relief Rec-
onciliation Act in May 2001, and expectations of some tax cut arose
even earlier.4 Hence under the LCPI model, consumption should not
significantly increase at the time of rebate receipt. Most previous tests
of the model in micro data have had trouble identifying such predictable
changes in income, which might have biased some of the tests against
rejecting the model (Shea 1995). Further, even studies that reject the
model often find it difficult to identify the source of their rejection.
The leading alternative model allows for liquidity constraints, but there
is still no consensus about their actual importance. (For a useful review
of the literature see Browning and Lusardi [1996].) Part of this dis-
agreement is due to difficulties identifying which households in the data
are in fact constrained. Most studies split the sample on the basis of net
worth, but net worth conflates credit demand and credit supply. The
fact that someone has low (even negative) net worth does not necessarily
imply that he has reached his borrowing limit (Jappelli 1990). One
advantage of using credit card data is that they separately record credit
limits and credit balances, which helps distinguish credit supply and
demand (Gross and Souleles 2002).
Using innovative questions about the 2001 rebate that were added to
the Michigan Survey of Consumers, Shapiro and Slemrod (2003a) found
that about 46 percent of respondents who received (or expected to
receive) a rebate reported that it would mostly lead them to pay down
debt (and another 32 percent of respondents reported that they would
mostly save the rebate, in the sense of accumulating assets). This finding
further justifies our focus on credit cards, whose debt carries higher
interest rates than other forms of consumer debt. Rebate recipients who
pay down debt should generally first pay down any credit card debt they
hold. We use distributed lag models that are interpretable as event
studies to estimate the month-by-month response of credit card pay-
ments, spending, and debt to the tax rebates. This allows us to determine
whether there are salient dynamics in consumers’ response to the re-
bates and, if so, helps identify the mechanisms behind the dynamics.
For instance, if consumers initially use the rebates to pay down debt
(or otherwise save) and thereby improve their balance sheets, what does
this imply about their subsequent spending?
Because credit cards play an important role in consumer finances,
they can be quite useful for studying consumer behavior. About 20
percent of aggregate personal consumption is being purchased using
credit cards (Chimerine 1997). Moreover, for most households, credit
4 Indeed, tax cuts were a central element of George W. Bush’s platform in the 2000
election. Moreover, the Treasury sent taxpayers a letter in advance informing them of the
size of their upcoming rebate and the particular week in which it would be disbursed.
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cards, in particular bank cards (e.g., Visa, MasterCard, Discover, and
Optima cards), represent the leading source of unsecured credit.5 About
two-thirds of households have at least one bank card, and of these
households at least 56 percent are borrowing on their bank cards, that
is, paying interest, not just transacting (1995 Survey of Consumer Fi-
nances [SCF]).6 Conditional on borrowing, in the mid to late 1990s the
typical bank card account was borrowing about $2,000, with the account
holder having roughly another $5,000 of balances on other cards. These
are large magnitudes relative to typical household balance sheets. They
are also large in the aggregate: Total credit card balances currently
amount to about $900 billion (Federal Reserve Board of Governors
2007).
Previewing the results, we find that, on average, consumers initially
saved some of the rebate, by increasing their credit card payments and
thereby paying down debt and increasing their liquidity. But soon af-
terward their spending increased, counter to the LCPI model and Ri-
cardian equivalence. For consumers whose most intensively used credit
card account is in the sample, spending on that account rose by over
$200 cumulatively over the nine months after rebate receipt, which
represents over 40 percent of the average household rebate. We also
find other significant heterogeneity across different types of consumers.
Notably, spending rose most for consumers who, according to various
criteria, were initially most likely to be liquidity constrained. By contrast,
debt declined most (so saving rose most) for unconstrained consumers.
These results suggest that liquidity constraints are important. More gen-
erally, the results suggest that there can be important dynamics in con-
sumers’ response to “lumpy” increases in income such as tax rebates,
working in part through balance sheet (liquidity) mechanisms.
Sections II and III discuss the data and the econometric methodology.
The main results appear in Section IV. Section V discusses related lit-
erature and Section VI presents conclusions. Appendices A, B, and C
contain some additional results and data description.
II. Data
We use a unique, proprietary data set from a large financial institution
that issues credit cards nationally. The data set contains a representative
5 Moreover, Jappelli, Pischke, and Souleles (1998) found that households with bank
cards are better able to smooth their consumption past income fluctuations than house-
holds without bank cards.
6 As discussed by Gross and Souleles (2002), this figure probably understates the actual
fraction of households borrowing on their bank cards, because SCF households appear
to underreport their bank card debt. This paragraph draws heavily on the article by Gross
and Souleles. See also Yoo (1998).
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sample of about 75,000 credit card accounts open as of June 2000,
followed monthly for 24 months.7 The bulk of the data consists of the
main billing information listed on each account’s monthly statement,
including total monthly payments, spending, balances, and debt, as well
as the credit limit. Note that credit cards can be used for both trans-
actions and borrowing purposes. “Debt” includes only interest-incurring
balances that are rolled over, whereas “balances” also includes trans-
actions balances that are paid off.
The data set also contains some credit bureau data about the other
credit cards held by each account holder, in particular the number of
other cards and their combined balances. (The credit bureaus do not
separately record credit card debt, spending, or payments; they record
only balances.) The credit card issuer obtained these data from the
credit bureaus quarterly. Finally, there is some limited demographic
data, that is, the age and marital status of the account holders. (Account
holders are assumed to be married if there is a spouse also listed on
the account.) An important advantage of the underlying data source is
that it also included a variable indicating the penultimate digit of the
account holders’ social security numbers. This variable was used to iden-
tify the time of rebate receipt.
This data set has a number of additional advantages. Relative to tra-
ditional household data sets such as the SCF, the sample is large with
little measurement error. Also, because each account is observed over
many months, it is possible to study high-frequency dynamics. However,
using credit card data does entail a number of limitations. The main
unit of analysis is a credit card account, not an individual (who can hold
multiple accounts). We partially circumvent this limitation by using the
available data about the account holders from the credit bureaus. Also,
we do not observe household assets or total spending (i.e., spending
via cash and checks).8 Table 1 provides summary statistics for the main
7 The sample excludes bankrupt/delinquent and dormant/closed accounts, which is
consistent with our interest in accounts that might potentially respond to the rebates.
8 As discussed below, as a result of such limitations, our main results are likely to un-
derstate the full effect of the rebates per account holder and per household. Nonetheless,
our results are broadly consistent with the consumption dynamics (described below, also
over a nine-month horizon) found by Johnson et al. (2006) using the Consumer Expen-
diture Survey, which records total household spending but does not separately distinguish
spending via credit cards, cash, or checks. Also, credit card data could capture a different
fraction of the response of total household debt (and total debt payments) relative to the
response of total spending. For example, if rebate recipients who pay down debt dispro-
portionately pay down their high-interest credit card debt but do relatively more of their
increased spending via checks and cash, then the credit card data could capture more of
the total response of debt than of spending. However, the article by Johnson et al. finds
that the largest consumption response to the rebate came in apparel, which is relatively
likely to be purchased using credit cards.
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TABLE 1
Sample Statistics (N p 739,945)
Variable Mean ($)
Standard
Deviation ($)
Payments 349 939
Spending 327 895
Debt 1,788 2,866
Balances 2,144 2,958
Other balances 7,871 13,030
Credit limit 8,584 3,353
Dpayments 5.3 1,234.7
Dspending 1.5 1,098.7
Ddebt 1.2 1,045.3
Note.—The data come from the monthly billing statement of credit card
accounts, except for “other balances” on the other credit cards held by the
account holders, which are obtained quarterly from the credit bureaus. All
values are averaged over the sample period (March 2001–May 2002) used in
the baseline results in table 2 and are quoted in current dollars. The differences
(D) measure average monthly changes over the sample period.
variables used below. Appendix C provides further details about the
data.
III. Methodology
We analyze the response of credit card account holders to the tax re-
bates, beginning with the monthly account-level data and later turning
to the credit bureau data. Specifically, we estimate distributed lag models
of the following form:
′ …Y p a time  b R  b R  b R   b R   , (1)i,t t 0 i,t 1 i,t1 2 i,t2 9 i,t9 i,t
where is an indicator variable for whether the holder of account iR i,t
received a rebate in month t. The dependent variable variously rep-Yi,t
resents either the spending ( ) or payments ( ) in account i in monthS Pi,t i,t
t, or the amount of debt held by account i at the end of month t ( ).Di,t
Because rebate receipt is a temporary event and debt is a stock variable,
to allow for potentially persistent effects of the rebate on debt, the
specification for debt uses the change in debt as the dependent variable
( ). Since payments and spending are flow var-Y p DD { D  Di,t i,t i,t i,t1
iables linked to the change in debt via an accounting identity, payments
and spending are accordingly analyzed in levels ( or ). TheY p S Pi,t i,t i,t
vector time represents a complete set of month indicator variables, that
is, a separate indicator for each month in t p March 2001–May 2002,
which is the available sample period given the original data set and the
lags utilized in estimation. These indicator variables control for all ag-
gregate effects, such as seasonality, the recession, changes in monetary
policy, and so forth.
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As in Gross and Souleles (2002), the results can be interpreted as an
event study. The coefficient b0 measures the immediate response of the
dependent variable to rebate receipt, in dollar terms. The marginal co-
efficients b1, b2, …, and b9 measure the additional responses one month
after rebate receipt, two months later, …, and nine months later, re-
spectively. (Allowing for nine lags is consistent with the available data
period and turned out in the baseline analysis to be sufficient for the
results to converge.) Therefore, for debt the cumulative coefficients
give the total change in debt after s months, . Forsb {  b s p 0–9s ttp0
the flow variables payments and spending, gives the cumulative sumbs
of changes in payments or spending over the first s months. For instance,
if spending rises by in the month of rebate receipt and afterb p $100
one month spending is still greater than it was before receipt,b p $51
then the cumulative effect on spending after month 1 is .b p $151
To gauge the expansionary impact of the rebate, the response of
spending is of central interest, especially the long-run cumulative re-
sponse . The responses of payments and debt are of independentb 9
interest and can also help shed light on the response of spending. Under
our specification the responses of all three variables are naturally related:
The total effect of the rebate on debt after s months ( ) will approx-DDbs
imately equal the difference of the cumulative effects of spending and
of payments over the s months ( ).S Pb  bs s
The key explanatory variable R depends only on the penultimate digit
of the account holders’ social security numbers. Following the Treasury’s
disbursement timetable, we assume that rebates were disbursed in July
2001 to account holders with a penultimate digit of 0 or 1, in August
2001 to those with a digit of 2–6, and in September 2001 to those with
a digit of 7–9. Since the digit is randomly assigned, the resulting variation
in the timing of rebate receipt is exogenous by construction. In an
extension we also briefly consider the response to rebates of different
sizes, using the data on marital status. However, this variation is related
to family structure and tax status (e.g., since couples filing jointly gen-
erally received the largest rebates) and so cannot be guaranteed to be
exogenous. By contrast, R uses only the part of the potential variation
that is guaranteed to be exogenous and so allows for a clean test of
whether there is a causal effect of the rebate on credit card usage.9
9 In previous studies of the response of consumption to changes in income, the income
change at issue was usually systematically related to various household characteristics, and
so the estimated effect of the income change might spuriously reflect these characteristics.
For instance, suppose that high-income households, which are more likely to own stocks,
receive larger windfalls (or other income gains), and also that for other reasons the stock
market happens to rise at the time of the windfall, leading high-income households to
increase their consumption. In this case the estimated (unconditional) effect of the wind-
fall on consumption would be exaggerated by the stock market appreciation. Here, by
contrast, since the timing of rebate receipt is independent of other personal characteristics,
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Indeed, since the account holder in the data is not necessarily the
member of the household who actually filed the tax return (and so
whose social security number determined the timing of rebate receipt)
and some households (effectively those with minimal tax liability) did
not even receive a rebate, the results will likely understate the full effect
of the rebate.10 Hence, by using the limited variation in R, we are setting
a high hurdle for finding significant effects of the rebate.
As an extension, we will also examine the response of the balances
on the other credit cards held by the account holders, using the credit
bureau data. These data were collected only quarterly, however, which
constrains their analysis. In interpreting these results we will accordingly
focus on whether the response of other balances appears to reinforce,
or to offset, the response of balances on the accounts in the main sample.
Unless indicated otherwise, equation (1) is estimated by ordinary least
squares, with the standard errors adjusted for heteroscedasticity across
accounts as well as serial correlation within accounts. We will also con-
sider several alternative specifications. In particular, we will test whether
the response to the rebate differs across different groups of account
holders, such as those who are potentially liquidity constrained. Indi-
cator variables for these groups will be added to equation (1), both
directly and interacted with and all nine of its lags.R i,t
IV. Results
We begin by estimating the average response of payments, spending,
and debt to the rebate, using the credit card accounts in the main
sample. We subsequently analyze the heterogeneity in response across
different types of account holders. Because we find significant differ-
ences across account holders, we discuss these results in detail. Finally,
we also examine the response of the other credit cards held by the
account holders, using the credit bureau data.
Table 2 and figure 1 show the baseline results from applying equation
(1) to payments, spending, and the change in debt in the main sample.
The table reports the marginal coefficients bs, , along with thes p 0–9
final cumulative coefficients , which summarize the long-run effectsb 9
of the rebate. The three graphs in figure 1 show the entire paths of
cumulative coefficients , , along with their corresponding 95b s p 0–9s
percent confidence intervals. The results can be interpreted as an event
by comparing consumers who received rebates at different times, we avoid omitted variables
bias and other confounding factors.
10 Nonetheless, the person who opened the bank card account is probably most likely
to be in charge of household finances and so disproportionately likely to be the tax filer.
Recall that about a third of households did not receive rebates. However, consumers with
credit cards are more likely to have received a rebate than those without credit cards.
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TABLE 2
Consumer Response to Rebates (N p 739,945)
Payments Spending DDebt
Coefficient
Standard
Error Coefficient
Standard
Error Coefficient
Standard
Error
b0 11.6 6.2* 2.8 5.6 14.3 7.2**
b1 11.4 8.1 6.2 7.2 6.0 9.0
b2 8.2 9.2 2.7 8.5 7.2 10.1
b3 3.8 10.1 7.6 9.3 5.0 10.9
b4 8.9 10.9 8.3 10.0 .3 11.7
b5 1.9 11.4 8.3 10.4 11.3 12.1
b6 2.9 11.7 13.8 10.4 15.9 12.3
b7 2.8 11.4 9.4 9.9 16.1 12.0
b8 0.6 10.7 6.4 9.0 10.1 11.2
b9 7.2 11.0 1.9 9.2 3.7 11.3
Test: {bs} joint
significance .14 .15 .07
Implied Long-Run Cumulative Effects
b9 48.7 54.5 61.7 68.9 27.5 23.3
Note.—This table reports the marginal effects bs of receiving a rebate, for each month after rebate receipt,s p 0–9
corresponding to the indicator variable and its nine lags, to , in eq. (1). The bottom row reports theR R Rt t1 t9
corresponding implied long-run cumulative effects, . All values are in current dollars (March 2001–May 2002). Theb9
reported p-values come from tests of the joint significance of the marginal effects b0 to b9. (These are equivalent to
tests of the joint significance of the cumulative effects to .) Each regression also includes a full set of month indicatorb b0 9
variables. The standard errors are adjusted for heteroscedasticity across accounts as well as serial correlation within
accounts.
* Significantly different from zero at the 10 percent level.
** Significantly different from zero at the 5 percent level.
study, with month 0 being the time of rebate receipt, in events p 0
time.
Starting with the point estimates for payments, in the month of rebate
receipt, (monthly) payments rise by on average. One monthb p $120
after receipt, payments are still larger than before receipt (sob p $111
), but the subsequent marginal coefficients tend to decline inb p $231
magnitude and significance (with only b0 being significant at the 10
percent level or better). As is evident in the first graph, the path of
cumulative payments plateaus after month 4. Allowing for some time
delay before consumers deposit their rebate check, make a larger pay-
ment to the issuer, and have that payment register on the monthly
statement, the point estimates imply that, on average, consumers initially
used some of the rebate to increase their credit card payments. The
average long-run, cumulative increase in payments is (bottomb p $499
of table 2).
As for spending, in the second graph in figure 1, the path of cu-
mulative spending coefficients is initially flatter than the path for pay-
ments. But after month 2 the path for spending starts to rise faster,
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Fig. 1.—Consumer response to rebates: the cumulative responses in monthsb s ps
after rebate receipt (as implied by the baseline results in table 2), along with their0–9
corresponding 95 percent confidence intervals (dashed lines), in current dollars.
overtaking the payments path after month 6 before plateauing.11 The
average long-run, cumulative increase in spending is , whichb p $629
corresponds to about 12 percent of the average household rebate. Al-
though not statistically significant, this baseline cumulative effect, like
the corresponding for payments, is economically significant, consid-b 9
ering that it reflects only the average response per credit card account,
not per account holder.
In general, the baseline results in table 2 are imprecisely estimated.
In part this is due to the limited random variation we are using. Since
estimating high-frequency, monthly responses to this variation is de-
manding of the data, the individual marginal coefficients are difficult
to estimate with precision. By summing across these coefficients, the
paths of cumulative effects for spending and payments are smoother,
but nonetheless their significance levels need not necessarily increase
with the horizon (s). (For spending, the significance of the baseline
cumulative coefficients does tend to increase with horizon, but only
slowly.) This reflects the fact that the estimates of the underlying mar-
ginal coefficients tend to have positive covariance across horizons, which
the standard errors for the cumulative coefficients take into account.
11 The delay before spending starts to increase is further discussed below. It partly reflects
the need for high-utilization account holders to first make payments before they can make
additional purchases (in addition to the short delay before payments and spending register
on the credit card statement), plus potentially other mechanisms, such as habits. Gross
and Souleles (2002) found qualitatively similar dynamics in average credit card spending
in the months after exogenous increases in credit limits.
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Even so, we shall see shortly that there are significant differences in
response across different account holders and that allowing for hetero-
geneity yields more significant marginal and cumulative coefficients for
certain types of account holders.12 Hence it is not surprising that the
full-sample results, which assume similar responses across all account
holders, are less significant.
The baseline results for payments and spending are reflected in the
results for debt in the third graph of figure 1. Since payments rise before
spending, debt initially declines, significantly so in month 0. The point
estimates imply that debt subsequently increases, reflecting the lagged
increases in spending. The estimated long-run change in debt isb 9
positive, but it is insignificant and small in magnitude (e.g., relative to
average debt levels of almost $2,000), both here and in most of the
subsequent analysis, so this particular result should not be overempha-
sized.13 Another way to assess the significance of the dynamics of debt
and of the other variables is to test the joint significance of the entire
set of marginal coefficients , which is equivalent to testing{bFs p 0–9}s
the joint significance of the cumulative coefficients .14 As{b Fs p 0–9}s
reported near the bottom of table 2, for debt the estimated coefficients
are jointly significant at the 7 percent level, with the initial coefficient
being the most significant.15
To illustrate more broadly the potential importance of such balance
sheet dynamics, consider someone who receives a $600 rebate and, as
12 For instance, for many of the key sample split groups analyzed later in table 3 (e.g.,
for young, low-limit, high-utilization, high-usage, and the “composite-constrained” account
holders), the significance levels of the cumulative coefficients for spending generally
increase with the horizon more quickly than in table 2, becoming statistically significant
within the nine months after rebate receipt. Also, in table A1, the cumulative significance
levels for both spending and payments generally increase in horizon for all four groups
of rebate recipients, becoming significant within a few months after receipt.
13 As evidenced by its relatively wide 95 percent confidence interval, which ranges from
about $19 to $74, for debt is insignificantly different from both zero and (and ,b b b9 0 2
the most negative cumulative coefficient). Thus, while one cannot reject the hypothesis
that debt reverts (zero long-run change), one also cannot reject the hypothesis that the
initial decline in debt is permanent. Nonetheless, as discussed below, both hypotheses can
be consistent with a significant increase in spending.
14 The reason is that the partial sums b0, are all zero if…b  b , … , b  b   b0 1 0 1 9
and only if the marginal coefficients are all zero.b , b , … , b0 1 9
15 To help further gauge the magnitudes of the results in table 2 and subsequent tables,
table 1 reports the average levels and average monthly changes of payments, spending,
and debt over the sample period. The dependent variables in eq. (1) also vary significantly
over time, since the month indicator variables (relative to the omitted first month of the
sample) are jointly significant in each of the three regressions in table 2 (for brevity, not
reported). For payments, the estimated coefficients on the 14 month indicators range
from $19 to $44, for an intrasample swing of about $63. For spending, all the month
coefficients are positive, with the largest being about $103; for the change in debt, the
coefficients range from $35 to $88, for a swing of about $123. Note that the estimated
’s in table 2 for spending and payments are sizable fractions of these intrasample swings.b9
They are also sizable relative to the annualized average monthly changes in table 1.
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a result, increases his total spending by the full $600, using a credit
card. Suppose that he uses the rebate proceeds to increase his credit
card payments by $600 to fully pay for the extra spending. In this case
there would be no longer-run effect on debt (we ignore any small dif-
ferences due to interest), even though spending fully responds to the
rebate. If the extra payments precede the extra spending, debt will first
decline but then recover. If instead spending partially responds to the
rebate, but by less than the full $600 in extra payments, then there
would be a persistent decline in debt. Hence a persistent decline in
debt is also consistent with an expansionary effect of spending (as long
as debt does not decline by the full amount of the extra payments). As
a result, since we can directly estimate the response of spending, we do
not need a precise estimate of the long-run change in debt in order to
gauge per se the expansionary effect of the rebate.
More generally, in the presence of significant spending dynamics,
static specifications that allow for only an immediate spending response
to the rebate would underestimate its full effect. In particular, without
a flexible dynamic analysis, it would be difficult to identify a lagged
response of spending to the extra liquidity arising after consumers ini-
tially save some of their rebate, whether by accumulating assets or paying
down debt.
The distributed lag specification in table 2 accommodates the average
monthly dynamics of the dependent variables in a very general way. As
an extension, we undertake some intramonthly analysis, distinguishing
account holders according to how early in the month (whether in July,
August, or September) their rebate was disbursed, with week 1 being
the first week in the month and week 4 being the last. For example, if
(marginal) spending takes place roughly evenly over the month, we
might be able to detect that the path of spending starts increasing
slightly earlier on average for those receiving their rebates earlier in
the month.
Since such intramonthly analysis is even more demanding of the data
than the baseline analysis in table 2, we impose some additional structure
for these results (and a few of the subsequent extensions). Note that,
although the baseline estimation was totally nonparametric, the results
turned out relatively well behaved. In particular, the baseline marginal
coefficients for spending and payments are generally positive, and they
generally decline in horizon for payments and are hump-shaped for
spending. Consequently, the cumulative effects for payments and spend-
ing are generally increasing (nondecreasing) in the horizon, before
eventually plateauing. To increase precision in the intramonthly spec-
ification, we impose a priori the constraint that the marginal responses
of spending and payments be nonnegative: for all s. In the simplestb ≥ 0s
analysis, spending and payments should not in general decline in re-
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sponse to an increase in liquidity, so this should be a relatively minimal
restriction. (By contrast, debt can decline, so we do not estimate this
specification for debt.)16
The resulting point estimates, reported in Appendix table A1, provide
some rough indication that the increases in spending and payments
begin slightly earlier for the early-in-the-month recipients (week 1) rel-
ative to the later-in-the-month recipients. However, these differences are
not statistically significant, so these results are inconclusive. Further
discussion of them is reserved for Appendix A. Not surprisingly, such
intramonthly comparisons cannot be made with much precision. None-
theless, many of the results are significant in absolute terms. Notably,
for both payments and spending, and for all four weeks of receipt, the
long-run cumulative effects are statistically and economically signif-b 9
icant, even though they do not significantly differ across the weeks. Since
the variation underlying these results for spending, as well as the other
significant results for spending below, is randomized, the results imply
a causal link from the rebate to spending, counter to the LCPI model.
We now turn to a comparison of how consumers of different demo-
graphic and credit characteristics responded to the rebate. Because it
is difficult to simultaneously estimate separate responses by week of
receipt for each of the different groups of account holders that we will
examine, we return to our baseline monthly specification (without im-
posing the nonnegativity constraint). Table 3 reports the long-run, cu-
mulative coefficients for each group, as well as p-values for the sig-b 9
nificance of these coefficients and of the corresponding coefficients at
an intermediate horizon of five months ( ). Figure 2 graphs all theb 5
cumulative coefficients, across all horizons , for payments,s p 0–9
spending, and the change in debt in separate panels. For each regres-
sion, table 3 also reports the joint significance of the marginal coeffi-
cients (equivalently, the cumulative coefficients) separately for each
group in the regression and also combined across all groups in the
regression (under the label “combined test”).
Panel A of table 3 starts with marital status. To equation (1) we added
indicator variables for couples and singles and interactions of these
variables with the rebate indicator and its nine lags. The results for
16 While the cumulative responses should not be negative, some marginal coefficients
could potentially go negative in some situations. For example, suppose that in response
to the rebate someone purchases a large durable good. As a result, in some subsequent
months spending could potentially end up lower than it would have been in the absence
of this purchase. However, in the baseline results in table 2, few of the marginal coefficients
for spending and payments are negative, and even then they are small in magnitude.
Consistently, in table A1 the nonnegativity constraint binds in just a few cases (indicated
by NA in the standard errors column). Also, Johnson et al. (2006) finds significant re-
sponses to the rebates only in nondurable expenditures (including apparel), not in ex-
penditures on larger durables.
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spending appear in the second set of columns in table 3. As reported,
spending by couples increases by somewhat more on average than
spending by singles: by versus cumulatively over theb p $74 b p $619 9
nine months after rebate receipt, though neither result is statistically
significant. Since the rebates that couples received were typically twice
as large ($600 vs. $300), their moderately greater spending in dollar
terms represents a smaller share of the rebates they received. The in-
termediate dynamics are displayed in figure 2, in the first two columns
of graphs (labeled with the prefix A). Singles initially increase their
payments, such that their debt significantly declines in the month of
receipt and further declines in the next two months (with the most
negative cumulative debt coefficient being [23]). However,b p $472
as their spending later increases, the point estimates for debt subse-
quently increase and become insignificant. These dynamics are reflected
in the joint significance of the singles’ marginal coefficients for debt
(p-value p 0.01 in table 3).
Panel B of table 3 instead considers age, contrasting young (!35 years
old), middle-aged, and older (160) account holders. For spending, the
long-run cumulative responses decline monotonically with age. Theb 9
spending of the young account holders increases on average by b p9
cumulatively. This response is statistically and economically sig-$200
nificant. It is also statistically significantly larger than the ’s of eachb 9
of the two groups of older account holders (despite the individual stan-
dard errors for each group). These results are suggestive of liquidity
constraints, since the young are disproportionately likely to be con-
strained (Jappelli 1990). If one reestimates this specification adding the
nonnegativity constraint for all s, while the resulting remainsb ≥ 0 bs 9
significant and larger for the young, it is statistically significant for each
of the older age groups as well. Moreover, even without the constraint,
the reported p-value of 0.04 for the combined test of significance in-
dicates that the marginal and cumulative coefficients for spending are
jointly significant when all three age groups are considered together
(i.e., considering all the coefficients for all ages a and all horizons{b }s,a
s jointly). Thus, after we allow for heterogeneity in age, the coefficients
for spending are jointly significant across the entire sample. Such results
illustrate the importance of heterogeneity.
The coefficients for spending are not, however, jointly significant for
the age groups separately, not even for the young whose is significant.b 9
While the young’s cumulative spending coefficients start to increase in
the first month after receipt, the increases (based on the underlying
marginal coefficients and reflected in fig. 2) become consistently sig-
nificant only after month 5. (Nonetheless, the cumulative coefficient
, although insignificant itself, is already significantly larger than theb 5
for the older account holders, at the 6 percent level.) This lag inb 5
1000
T
A
B
L
E
3
H
et
er
o
g
en
ei
ty
in
th
e
R
es
po
n
se
to
R
eb
at
es
Pa
ym
en
ts
Sp
en
d
in
g
D
D
eb
t
b 9
St
an
da
rd
E
rr
or
Te
st
:
b
p
0
9
Te
st
:
b
p
0
5
Te
st
:
{b
s}
Si
gn
ifi
ca
n
ce
b 9
St
an
da
rd
E
rr
or
Te
st
:
b
p
0
9
Te
st
:
b
p
0
5
Te
st
:
{b
s}
Si
gn
ifi
ca
n
ce
b 9
St
an
da
rd
E
rr
or
Te
st
:
b
p
0
9
Te
st
:
b
p
0
5
Te
st
:
{b
s}
Si
gn
ifi
ca
n
ce
A
.
M
ar
it
al
St
at
us
(N
p
73
9,
94
5)
Si
n
gl
es
73
.6
78
.1
.3
5
.2
5
.2
8
60
.7
70
.0
.3
9
.6
9
.1
8
9.
6
78
.9
.9
0
.4
9
.0
1
C
ou
pl
es
16
.2
85
.4
.8
5
.6
0
.2
1
73
.6
76
.3
.3
3
.2
1
.7
1
57
.9
85
.4
.5
0
.6
0
.6
0
C
om
bi
n
ed
te
st
.1
1
.2
0
.0
2
B
.
A
ge
(N
p
72
0,
81
8)
!
35
48
.0
94
.7
.6
1
.8
7
.9
5
19
9.
6
84
.7
.0
2
.1
7
.1
7
13
1.
2
94
.5
.1
7
.4
8
.4
4
35
–6
0
69
.5
81
.6
.3
9
.2
7
.5
0
56
.8
73
.1
.4
4
.3
6
.6
3
.9
82
.3
.9
9
.8
3
.6
1
1
60
28
.3
85
.8
.7
4
.3
5
.5
4
23
.3
77
.8
.7
6
.8
9
.1
9
29
.7
87
.5
.7
3
.4
2
.0
3
C
om
bi
n
ed
te
st
.7
8
.0
4
.1
3
C
.
C
re
di
t
L
im
it
(N
p
73
1,
61
6)
≤$
7,
00
0
41
.2
79
.4
.6
0
.5
6
.2
7
14
1.
0
71
.4
.0
5
.4
2
.0
1
10
9.
0
79
.7
.1
7
.9
4
.1
4
$7
,0
00
–$
10
,5
00

17
.5
83
.5
.8
3
.6
5
.4
5
30
.4
75
.2
.6
9
.6
9
.8
5
75
.2
84
.0
.3
7
.9
7
.3
3
1
$1
0,
50
0
19
3.
2
10
1.
8
.0
6
.0
8
.0
7
39
.7
93
.2
.6
7
.3
4
.3
9

14
5.
3
10
4.
6
.1
6
.4
5
.1
3
C
om
bi
n
ed
te
st
.0
3
.0
01
.0
02
1001
D
.
U
ti
liz
at
io
n
(N
p
73
9,
92
3)
1
90
22
4.
5
13
1.
0
.0
9
.1
2
.0
4
33
2.
8
10
6.
2
.0
02
.0
2
.0
01
99
.3
14
5.
8
.5
0
.8
3
.1
2
50
–9
0
10
3.
5
10
2.
4
.3
1
.7
0
.6
0
12
4.
3
87
.3
.1
5
.1
9
.4
1
67
.2
11
0.
0
.5
4
.3
8
.7
3
1–
50
25
.1
78
.5
.7
5
.4
1
.3
5
19
.7
70
.6
.7
8
.9
2
.8
8
4.
9
78
.0
.9
5
.4
8
.3
4
≤0
4.
0
92
.5
.9
7
.5
7
.9
2
48
.7
89
.7
.5
9
.5
2
.7
0
43
.9
96
.4
.6
5
.9
3
.4
5
C
om
bi
n
ed
te
st
.2
3
.0
6
.3
4
E
.
U
sa
ge
R
at
io
(N
p
70
7,
24
8)
1
3
75
.4
88
.1
.3
9
.2
2
.2
8
23
5.
8
78
.9
.0
03
.0
5
.0
01
12
7.
0
84
.8
.1
3
.8
5
.0
8
0–
3
54
.7
82
.3
.5
1
.3
4
.1
7

20
.4
73
.2
.7
8
.8
8
.4
3

40
.5
83
.5
.6
3
.4
0
.0
4
0
1.
7
10
3.
1
.9
9
.8
1
.9
3

34
.7
98
.8
.7
3
.6
7
.4
6

9.
9
10
7.
8
.9
3
.6
4
.1
4
C
om
bi
n
ed
te
st
.3
4
.0
01
.0
02
F.
C
om
po
si
te
Sp
lit
(N
p
70
7,
16
2)
C
on
st
ra
in
ed
10
3.
5
89
.8
.2
5
.5
7
.5
4
21
1.
9
79
.8
.0
1
.1
4
.1
3
11
2.
2
90
.9
.2
2
.5
6
.3
1
U
n
co
n
st
ra
in
ed
28
0.
9
96
.7
.0
04
.0
1
.0
1
36
.5
87
.7
.6
8
.6
8
.4
2

22
5.
5
98
.6
.0
2
.0
4
.0
3
N
o
ba
la
n
ce
49
.9
10
3.
2
.6
3
.6
4
.9
6
12
.8
98
.8
.9
0
.8
6
.3
6

5.
6
10
7.
8
.9
6
.6
7
.1
6
O
th
er

96
.3
82
.9
.2
5
.9
2
.3
1

5.
7
74
.4
.9
4
.9
7
.5
5
10
4.
3
82
.9
.2
1
.9
8
.0
9
C
om
bi
n
ed
te
st
.0
01
.0
1
.0
01
N
o
te
.—
T
h
is
ta
bl
e
sh
ow
s
th
e
lo
n
g-
ru
n
cu
m
ul
at
iv
e
re
sp
on
se
to
th
e
re
ba
te
,
,
ac
ro
ss
di
ff
er
en
t
de
co
m
po
si
ti
on
s
of
th
e
sa
m
pl
e
ac
co
un
t
h
ol
de
rs
.
(T
h
e
co
rr
es
po
n
di
n
g
pa
th
s
of
cu
m
ul
at
iv
e
b 9
co
ef
fi
ci
en
ts
,
,
ar
e
gr
ap
h
ed
in
fi
g.
2,
gr
ou
pe
d
un
de
r
th
e
sa
m
e
la
be
ls
A
to
F.
)
E
ac
h
pa
n
el
A
–F
co
rr
es
po
n
ds
to
a
di
ff
er
en
t
re
gr
es
si
on
.
E
ac
h
re
gr
es
si
on
ad
ds
to
eq
.
(1
)
an
in
di
ca
to
r
b
sp
0–
9
s
va
ri
ab
le
fo
r
ea
ch
gr
ou
p
of
ac
co
un
t
h
ol
de
rs
in
th
e
re
gr
es
si
on
,
an
d
it
s
in
te
ra
ct
io
n
w
it
h
re
ba
te
re
ce
ip
t
an
d
it
s
n
in
e
la
gs
.
In
ea
ch
lin
e
of
a
gi
ve
n
re
gr
es
si
on
,
p-
va
lu
es
ar
e
re
po
rt
ed
fo
r
te
st
s
of
R
t
th
e
jo
in
t
si
gn
ifi
ca
n
ce
of
th
e
m
ar
gi
n
al
co
ef
fi
ci
en
ts
{b
s}
(e
qu
iv
al
en
tl
y,
th
e
cu
m
ul
at
iv
e
co
ef
fi
ci
en
ts
)
ac
ro
ss
al
l
h
or
iz
on
s,
fo
r
th
e
gr
ou
p
in
th
at
lin
e
se
pa
ra
te
ly
.T
h
e
“c
om
bi
n
ed
te
st
”
gi
ve
s
th
e
p-
{b
} s
va
lu
es
fo
r
th
e
jo
in
t
si
gn
ifi
ca
n
ce
of
th
es
e
co
ef
fi
ci
en
ts
jo
in
tl
y
ac
ro
ss
al
l
gr
ou
ps
in
th
e
re
gr
es
si
on
.T
h
e
ut
ili
za
ti
on
ra
te
is
ba
la
n
ce
s
on
th
e
ac
co
un
t
n
or
m
al
iz
ed
by
th
e
cr
ed
it
lim
it
.T
h
e
us
ag
e
ra
ti
o
m
ea
su
re
s
ba
la
n
ce
s
on
th
e
ac
co
un
t
re
la
ti
ve
to
ba
la
n
ce
s
on
al
l
ot
h
er
cr
ed
it
ca
rd
s.
In
pa
n
el
F,
th
e
“c
on
st
ra
in
ed
”
gr
ou
p
in
cl
ud
es
ac
co
un
t
h
ol
de
rs
w
h
o
ar
e
yo
un
g
or
h
av
e
a
sm
al
l
cr
ed
it
lim
it
re
su
lt
in
g
in
h
ig
h
ut
ili
za
ti
on
;t
h
e
“u
n
co
n
st
ra
in
ed
”
gr
ou
p
in
cl
ud
es
ac
co
un
t
h
ol
de
rs
w
h
o
h
av
e
la
rg
e
lim
it
s,
or
w
h
o
ar
e
ol
de
r
w
it
h
lo
w
ut
ili
za
ti
on
an
d
lo
w
bu
t
po
si
ti
ve
us
ag
e;
“n
o
ba
la
n
ce
”
in
cl
ud
es
ac
co
un
ts
w
it
h
a
us
ag
e
ra
ti
o
of
0;
an
d
“o
th
er
”
re
pr
es
en
ts
th
e
re
m
ai
n
in
g
ac
co
un
ts
.E
ac
h
re
gr
es
si
on
al
so
in
cl
ud
es
a
fu
ll
se
to
fm
on
th
in
di
ca
to
rs
.T
h
e
st
an
da
rd
er
ro
rs
ar
e
ad
ju
st
ed
fo
rh
et
er
os
ce
da
st
ic
it
y
ac
ro
ss
ac
co
un
ts
as
w
el
l
as
se
ri
al
co
rr
el
at
io
n
w
it
h
in
ac
co
un
ts
.S
am
pl
e
si
ze
s
ap
pe
ar
in
pa
re
n
th
es
es
(N
).
1002
Fi
g
.
2.
—
H
et
er
og
en
ei
ty
in
th
e
re
sp
on
se
to
re
ba
te
s:
th
e
cu
m
ul
at
iv
e
co
ef
fi
ci
en
ts
co
rr
es
po
n
di
n
g
to
th
e
gr
ou
ps
of
ac
co
un
t
h
ol
de
rs
in
ta
bl
e
3,
al
on
g
b s
w
it
h
95
pe
rc
en
t
co
n
fi
de
n
ce
in
te
rv
al
s
(d
as
h
ed
lin
es
),
in
cu
rr
en
t
do
lla
rs
.S
ee
ta
bl
e
3
fo
r
de
ta
ils
.(
Fo
r
re
ad
ab
ili
ty
,a
fe
w
of
th
e
la
rg
es
t
[i
n
ab
so
lu
te
va
lu
e]
co
n
fi
de
n
ce
in
te
rv
al
po
in
ts
ar
e
om
it
te
d;
ta
bl
e
3
re
po
rt
s
al
l
th
e
fi
n
al
st
an
da
rd
er
ro
rs
,
fo
r
.)
b 9
1003
Fi
g
.
2.
—
C
on
tin
ue
d
Fi
g
.
2.
—
C
on
tin
ue
d
consumer spending and tax rebates 1005
spending (both here and in later results below) can potentially be ex-
plained by a number of additional mechanisms, such as habits or other
costs of adjusting consumption, precautionary motives (e.g., Carroll
1992), time to search and buy, or heterogeneous inattention (e.g., Reis
2006).17
By contrast, for older account holders (and, to a lesser extent, the
middle-aged), the point estimates suggest more of an initial decline in
debt, though this decline is not statistically significant and the point
estimates subsequently increase. Nonetheless, in month 5 after receipt,
their change in debt is still negative and (although insignificant itself)
significantly different from that of the young, at the 7 percent level.
Our data allow for even more direct tests for liquidity constraints.
One advantage of credit card data is that they separately record credit
limits and credit balances. On average, consumers whose balances start
near their limits are expected to be more likely to be liquidity con-
strained (Gross and Souleles 2002). Panel C of table 3 starts by consid-
ering the credit limit alone, since it is more exogenous than balances.
(To further minimize any endogeneity, we lag the credit limits, taking
them from month , the start of the distributed lag horizon in eq.t  9
[1].) We divide the accounts into those with low credit limits (≤$7,000),
which constitute about two-fifths of the sample; intermediate limits,
another two-fifths; and high limits (1$10,500), the remaining fifth. The
low-limit accounts are most likely on average to actually be constrained
by their limit.18
As expected, the low-limit accounts do exhibit the largest increase in
spending. The long-run, cumulative increase is . This responseb p $1419
is economically and statistically significant and significantly larger than
the of the intermediate-limit group. While the marginal spendingb 9
coefficients for the low-limit group are jointly significant, the resulting
17 As discussed below, Johnson et al. (2006) also finds a persistent response of con-
sumption over the nine months after rebate receipt. The response is somewhat back-
loaded for certain categories of expenditure, such as apparel, which as noted is the largest
contributor to the overall response of consumption and is relatively likely to be purchased
using credit cards.
One should also keep in mind the relatively wide confidence intervals around the
estimated coefficients at different horizons (as evident in fig. 2). This partly reflects the
imprecision associated with nonparametric estimation, especially in the smaller effective
samples for the various subgroups of accounts in table 3. If one imposes the nonnegativity
constraint for all s, the results tend to be even more significant than those reportedb ≥ 0s
in table 3. For example, under the constraint, for the spending of the young, all the
marginal coefficients, other than b0 and b2, are significant at the 10 percent level or better,
and the corresponding cumulative coefficients are all significant after month 2.
18 For example, on average these accounts have the largest utilization rates. For the
regressions that split the sample directly using the credit limit, we exclude the (relatively
few) accounts with limits below $1,000 to accommodate the typical rebates of $300–$600.
This exclusion leads to slightly sharper but similar results when splitting using the limit,
but has very little effect if applied to the baseline results.
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increase in spending is again back-loaded. On the basis of the point
estimates, cumulative payments for this group initially increase faster
than cumulative spending, so their debt initially declines. However, the
decline in debt is insignificant and small in magnitude, and debt sub-
sequently increases as spending later overtakes payments.19
By contrast, the high-limit accounts exhibit a substantial increase in
payments, by almost $200 cumulatively. This response is significant at
the 6 percent level (and at the 5 percent level when the nonnegativity
constraint is imposed). It is also significantly larger than the corre-
sponding for the low-limit group (despite the individual standardb 9
errors for each group). However, the high-limit accounts do not show
much change in spending. Consequently, their debt declines by $145
by month 9, a substantial amount. While this decline is imprecisely
estimated, it is significantly different from the corresponding for theb 9
low-limit group. Thus, the high-limit account holders, who were ex-
pected most likely to be unconstrained, are in fact more likely to save
their rebates by paying down debt. Their response is more consistent
with the LCPI model. The contrast between this response and the sub-
stantial increase in spending by the low-limit account holders suggests
that the latter are indeed relatively likely to be liquidity constrained
(with the noted qualification about the back-loading of their spending).
Panel D of table 3 groups accounts according to their initial utilization
rate, defined as the ratio of balances to the credit limit. While low-limit
account holders are relatively likely to be constrained by their limit,
using utilization directly should be even more likely to identify the
account holders whose limits are actually binding, and so should yield
sharper results.20 To minimize endogeneity, utilization is taken from
month .t  9
Almost 10 percent of the accounts have utilization rates above 90
percent. For them liquidity constraints are most likely on average to be
binding. In fact, as reported the cumulative increase in their spending
19 We shall see shortly that part of the explanation for these dynamics appears to be
that account holders who start with high utilization rates first need to make payments
before they can increase spending. For high-utilization accounts, the initial rise in spending
takes place very soon after the initial rise in payments, so that the rise in spending is
relatively more front-loaded (less back-loaded) than for other groups. Since the other
groupings of potentially constrained accounts, such as low-limit accounts, are not perfectly
correlated with the high-utilization accounts, this relative front-loading gets attenuated
for the other groupings.
20 For example, Gross and Souleles (2002) found that, for credit card accounts with
high utilization rates (above 90 percent), spending sharply rises after increases in liquidity
caused by increases in credit limits, significantly more than for lower-utilization accounts.
These results, which split the sample using utilization directly, are sharper than analogous
results using other indicators of liquidity constraints, such as age. Other credit bureau
data suggest that account holders who have high utilization rates on a given credit card
also tend to have high utilization rates on their other cards and so high total credit card
utilization rates at the account holder level.
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is a substantial . This response is statistically significant andb p $3339
also significantly larger than the ’s of each of the groups with lowerb 9
utilization. For the high-utilization accounts, the marginal coefficients
for spending are jointly very significant (p-value p .001), and many of
the individual coefficients are large and significant, starting in the sec-
ond month after receipt. Accordingly, starting in month 2, all the cu-
mulative coefficients are significant. As evident in figure 2, for this group
the response of spending is relatively sharp and less back-loaded than
the previous results for the young and low-limit groups.
Since the high-utilization account holders started near their limits,
how can they substantially increase their spending? They first make large
initial payments in order to create liquidity in terms of available credit.
Indeed, for this group the marginal coefficients for payments are jointly
significant, with the initial coefficients b0 through b2 being especially
large and significant (at the 5 percent level for b2).
21 The cumulative
$225 increase in payments is substantial and significant at the 10 percent
level. Overall, the results for the high-utilization group are indicative of
binding liquidity constraints.
As for the other groups in panel D of table 3, the accounts with lower
utilization rates—of 50–90 percent, 1–50 percent, and zero—constitute
about 20 percent, 60 percent, and 10 percent of the sample, respectively.
For the accounts with 50–90 percent utilization, the estimated forb 9
spending is still substantial in magnitude, albeit insignificant and smaller
than for the high-utilization group. This is consistent with the idea that
the intermediate-utilization accounts face a material, albeit smaller,
probability of being constrained.22 Their debt does not decline in the
months after receipt (apart from a tiny coefficient for monthb p $40
0). By contrast, for the accounts with positive but small utilization (1–
21 As seen in the paths for payments and spending in fig. 2, the initial rise in payments
resembles the initial rise in spending shifted one month earlier. Thus debt declines in
months 0 and 1, with (41) being significant at the 10 percent level. But sub-b p $711
sequently the point estimates for debt increase and become insignificant. Account holders
who start constrained by their credit card limit could of course spend their rebate without
using their credit card. But if for various reasons (e.g., convenience, safety, perks, etc.)
they prefer to use their card for their marginal spending (e.g., on apparel), then they
need to first increase their payments.
22 Gross and Souleles (2002) also found an intermediate response to liquidity by accounts
with utilization rates of 50–90 percent. They note that this response is consistent with
models with precautionary motives, in which liquidity constraints matter even if they do
not currently bind, as long as there is a possibility that they bind in the future. Our
utilization cutoffs are based on those in the Gross and Souleles article, but of course the
particular cutoffs are somewhat arbitrary. In general, the tighter the cutoff, the more likely
the resulting group includes consumers with a high probability of being constrained. If
we tighten the definition of the second utilization group to 60–90 percent utilization, the
resulting becomes larger (though it remains smaller than the for those with utilizationb b9 9
above 90 percent) and significant at the 6 percent level. About 20 percent of the sample
accounts have utilization above 60 percent.
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50 percent), debt significantly declines in the month of receipt. Al-
though the later point estimates are insignificant, they continue to de-
cline through month 4 (with [40]) before subsequentlyb p $424
increasing. Regarding the accounts that start with zero utilization (and
so no balances), one might expect them to be relatively less likely to
respond at all to the rebate. Indeed, their results suggest little response.
Their cumulative coefficients are all relatively small in magnitude and
insignificant, with somewhat larger confidence intervals because of the
smaller sample size. These results might be thought of as characterizing,
in a sense, the amount of underlying noise in the data.
The average household has over two credit cards (1995 SCF), so by
estimating at the account level, we have so far probably understated the
full effect of the rebate per account holder. As a starting point we could
look at account holders who have only one credit card in total—the
card in our sample—but they are probably not representative. However,
one can generalize the notion of having only one card, since consumers
with multiple cards can choose to concentrate their usage on a subset
of their cards. As one way of measuring the relative intensity of usage
of the card in our sample, we define the “usage ratio” as balances on
the sample account relative to all other credit card balances held by
the account holder, based on the most recent credit bureau data. Con-
sumers with a large usage ratio are relatively intensive users of the ac-
counts in the sample. If the intensively used accounts tend to be the
marginal accounts in terms of spending, then these accounts would be
expected to respond the most to the rebate, and vice versa.23
Panel E of table 3 distinguishes accounts with usage ratios of above
3, 0–3, and 0 (approximately 30 percent, 60 percent, and 10 percent
of the sample, respectively), taking the usage ratio from month tot  9
minimize endogeneity. Starting with the high–usage ratio accounts, their
spending increases by over $200 cumulatively. This response is statisti-
cally and economically significant, corresponding to over 40 percent of
the average household rebate. The response is also significantly larger
than that of the accounts with a usage ratio of 0.24 For the high-usage
accounts, the underlying marginal coefficients for spending are also
jointly very significant (p-value p .001). The resulting path of cumulative
spending coefficients is somewhat back-loaded, but nonetheless the co-
efficients are significant by month 5 (as reported) and subsequently.
23 To illustrate the opposite case, suppose that after consumers put significant balances
on one account, they use their other accounts with smaller balances for their marginal
spending. Then the latter accounts might respond the most to the rebate. This case is
not, however, supported by the results below.
24 The results based on the number of credit cards held are consistent: Consumers who
also have other credit cards (outside the sample) spend less on their account in the sample
than consumers who do not have other cards.
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By contrast, for the middle-usage accounts, the point estimates show
little change in spending and a moderate increase in payments, and so
a moderate decline in debt. This decline is significant in the first few
months, and while it subsequently becomes less significant, it is relatively
persistent, with .25 Regarding the accounts with a usage ratiob p $419
of 0, they generally show little response to the rebate, like the accounts
with zero utilization.26
Finally, building on the previous results, panel F of table 3 utilizes a
composite sample split that uses multiple characteristics to distinguish
account holders who are relatively likely to be constrained from those
who are relatively likely to be unconstrained. The composite split iden-
tifies potentially constrained account holders (labeled as “constrained”
in the table) as those who are young (≤35 years old) or have a small
credit limit (≤$7,000) that is relatively likely to be binding because of
high utilization (above 60 percent). This group is expected to increase
spending the most. The potentially “unconstrained” group includes ac-
count holders who have large limits (1$10,500), or who are older (155
years old) with low utilization (below 40 percent) and low but positive
usage (usage ratio between 0 and 0.4). This group is expected to increase
payments and reduce debt the most. The composite split puts accounts
with a usage ratio of 0 into a separate group (labeled “no balance”),
which is expected to show relatively little response to the rebate. These
three groups constitute about 25 percent, 25 percent, and 10 percent
of the sample, respectively. The remaining, harder to classify, 40 percent
of accounts are grouped together as “other.”27
25 For the middle-usage accounts, the for payments becomes significant when theb9
nonnegativity constraint is imposed. The decline in their debt becomes more pronounced
if one restricts the group to accounts with a usage ratio between 0 and 0.4, which is
approximately the median ratio. Accordingly, this modified cutoff is used in the composite
split in panel F of table 3.
26 One small difference between these groups is that the lowest-utilization group includes
the (relatively few) accounts with negative utilization (e.g., due to overpayment or returns),
whereas the usage ratio drops observations with negative balances. The point estimates
for the group with a usage ratio of 0 show a moderate initial decline in debt. However,
this is driven by an (implausible) estimated decline in spending, but this decline is small
in magnitude and insignificant after the month of receipt.
27 Some of the cutoffs used in defining these groups were slightly relaxed relative to
the cutoffs in the previous “univariate” splits based on a single characteristic, in order to
keep the composite groups from getting too small. Previous notes commented on some
of these modifications. For example, accounts with utilization between 60 percent and 90
percent show a significant increase in spending (at the 6 percent level), albeit smaller
than for accounts with utilization above 90 percent. We also considered some even more
expansive cutoffs. In general, we could expand the size of the composite-constrained group
and still find a significant, albeit smaller, increase in spending. Presumably the reason is
that such expansions tend to include in the group more accounts with a smaller probability
of being constrained. By contrast, we were unable to expand the unconstrained group by
much and still find a significant decline in debt. As before, the characteristics used to
form the groups are taken from month to minimize endogeneity.t  9
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Beginning with the potentially constrained account holders, as re-
ported, spending significantly increases, by a cumulative . Thisb p $2129
response is statistically and economically significant and significantly
larger than that of each of the three other groups. The response is again
somewhat back-loaded. According to the point estimates, payments ini-
tially increase faster than spending, leading to a small initial decline in
debt (though the cumulative coefficients for payments are all insignif-
icant, and for debt only is significant at the 10 percent level or better).b 0
Debt subsequently increases, however, as spending later overtakes pay-
ments. By contrast, for the potentially unconstrained account holders,
payments significantly increase, by a substantial cumulative amount
. This response is statistically significant and significantlyb p $2819
larger than the corresponding for the constrained group. Many ofb 9
the initial marginal payment coefficients for the unconstrained group
are significant, so all their cumulative coefficients after the month of
receipt are significant (and even the immediate response is significantb 0
at the 10 percent level). On the other hand, their spending increases
by a much smaller and insignificant amount. Hence their debt persis-
tently decreases, by a substantial amount , which is statisti-b p $2269
cally significant.
Overall, the results for these two groups are qualitatively similar to,
but sharper than, the results for the corresponding groups in panel C
of table 3 using just the limit. Hence, subject to the same qualifications,
the results again suggest that liquidity constraints are indeed more likely
to be binding for the account holders who were identified as con-
strained. Conversely, the account holders identified as unconstrained
behave more consistently with the LCPI model. More generally, these
results, along with the other results in table 3, show that there is sig-
nificant heterogeneity in the response of different consumers to the
rebates.
We briefly turn to the remaining groups in panel F. The results for
the “no balance” group are like those in panel E for the group with a
usage ratio of 0. For the “other” group, the cumulative coefficients are
all insignificant.28
As an extension, we also directly examined the response of the ac-
count holders’ other credit cards, using the credit bureau data. In sum,
the response of balances on the other cards is qualitatively similar to
that of balances on the accounts in the main sample, so these results
generally reinforce (or at least do not offset) our previous results. How-
28 The point estimates for the “other” group show an (implausible) late decline in
cumulative payments, but these estimates are not statistically significant. The results for
the “no balance” group are not exactly identical to those for the group with a usage ratio
of 0 in panel E because of differences in the other groups used in the two regressions
(e.g., due to different missing values).
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ever, the estimates are insignificant, and so the results are inconclusive.
Identification of the response of other balances is complicated by the
fact that the credit bureau data are available only quarterly. Accordingly,
further discussion of these results is reserved for Appendix B, with the
results appearing in table B1.
V. Related Literature
A few previous papers have studied consumers’ response to tax rebates
and refunds. Modigliani and Steindel (1977), Blinder (1981), and Po-
terba (1988) found that consumption responded too much to the 1975
tax rebate, relative to the prediction of the LCPI model, though they
came to somewhat different quantitative conclusions regarding the tim-
ing and overall magnitude of the response. All three studies used ag-
gregate time-series data, but there are a number of advantages to using
micro-level data as well. First, it is difficult to analyze infrequent events
such as tax cuts using time-series data.29 Second, with micro data one
can use cross-sectional variation to investigate consumer heterogeneity,
including issues such as liquidity constraints. Among recent studies using
micro data, one of the most closely related to this article is Souleles
(1999), which found that consumption responds significantly to the
federal income tax refunds that most taxpayers receive each spring. That
paper also found evidence of liquidity constraints.30
Two recent papers analyzed the response to the 2001 tax rebates in
particular. First, as noted in the introduction, Shapiro and Slemrod
(2003a) found that the majority of their survey respondents reported
that they would mostly save their rebate, most commonly by paying down
debt. Only 22 percent of the respondents reported that they would
mostly spend their rebate, a finding the authors calculate to imply an
average marginal propensity to consume of about one-third. These re-
sults are consistent with our finding that, on average, consumers initially
used some of the rebate to increase their credit card payments and pay
down debt. The Michigan survey results provide no evidence, however,
29 Blinder and Deaton (1985) found smaller consumption responses when considering
the 1975 rebate together with the 1968–70 tax surcharge. However, consumption was
found to be too sensitive to the preannounced changes in taxes in the later phases of the
Reagan tax cuts. The authors note that their mixed results are “probably not precise
enough to persuade anyone to abandon strongly held a priori views” (498).
30 Other related studies of the response of consumption to income include Bodkin
(1959), Kreinin (1961), Wilcox (1989, 1990), Parker (1999), Souleles (2000, 2002, 2004),
Browning and Collado (2001), Hsieh (2003), and Stephens (2003, 2005, 2006), among
others.
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of a lagged response of spending or of liquidity constraints.31 Second,
a concurrent paper by Johnson et al. (2006) finds, using the Consumer
Expenditure Survey, that consumers spent on average about a third of
their rebates during the three-month period in which they were re-
ceived, counter to the LCPI model. This finding implies that consumers
initially saved most of the rebate, though their data do not allow the
authors to distinguish whether the saving took place by paying down
debt or by accumulating assets. Moreover, they also find significant evi-
dence of a substantial lagged consumption response over the next two
quarters, with the long-run cumulative response being roughly two-
thirds of the rebate on average. Illiquid households exhibited the stron-
gest response. Despite the differences between consumption expendi-
ture and credit card spending, these results are broadly consistent with
the dynamics of credit card usage we estimated above.32
VI. Conclusion
This article used a unique, new panel data set of credit card accounts
to analyze how consumers responded to the 2001 federal income tax
rebates. We used distributed lag models to estimate the month-by-month
response of credit card payments, spending, and debt to the rebates,
exploiting the randomized timing of the rebates’ disbursement to
cleanly identify their causal effects. By limiting ourselves to the subset
of potential variation that is by construction exogenous, we set a high
hurdle for finding significant effects of the rebate.
We found that, on average, consumers initially saved some of the
rebate, by increasing their credit card payments and thereby paying
down debt and increasing their liquidity. But soon afterward their spend-
ing increased, counter to the canonical LCPI model and Ricardian
equivalence. For consumers whose most intensively used credit card
account is in the sample, spending on that account rose by over $200
cumulatively over the nine months after rebate receipt, which represents
over 40 percent of the average household rebate. Because these results
31 McNees (1973) analyzed similar surveys of refund recipients in 1972. Of his sample,
45 percent said they spent their refund, 24 percent saved it, and 28 percent used it to
pay off debt and bills. Shapiro and Slemrod (1995) analyzed a similar survey after the
change in withholding rates in 1992. Shapiro and Slemrod (2003b) used a novel follow-
up survey in 2002 to try to determine whether there was a lagged response to the 2001
rebate. Of the survey respondents who said they initially mostly used the rebate to pay
down debt, most report that they will “try to keep [down their] lower debt for at least a
year” (96).
32 While our results do not use aggregate time-series variation, they are also consistent
with the aggregate data on consumption expenditure and saving discussed by Johnson et
al. (2006). Aggregate spending rose substantially in the three quarters during and after
which the rebates were disbursed, whereas the saving rate rose substantially in the quarter
of disbursement, but then dropped in the next quarter.
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relied exclusively on exogenous, randomized variation, they represent
compelling evidence of a causal link from the rebate to spending.
We also found other significant heterogeneity in the response to the
rebate across different types of consumers. Notably, spending rose most
for consumers who, according to various criteria, were initially most
likely to be liquidity constrained—by up to over $300 depending on the
criterion and its tightness. By contrast, debt declined most (so saving
rose most) for unconstrained consumers. These results suggest that li-
quidity constraints are important. More generally, the results suggest
that there can be important dynamics in consumers’ response to “lumpy”
increases in income such as tax rebates, working in part through balance
sheet (liquidity) mechanisms.
Appendix A
Intramonthly Analysis
Table A1 reports the results of the intramonthly analysis described in Section
IV. As noted, the point estimates in the table provide some rough indication
that the increases in spending and payments begin slightly earlier for the early-
in-the-month recipients relative to the later-in-the-month recipients: The initial
marginal coefficients b0 are somewhat larger for the recipients in week 1 relative
to the other recipients, though these coefficients are not fully monotonic across
the weeks of receipt. Also, these differences in month 0 are not statistically
significant, and jointly across all horizons the paths of spending and of payments
do not significantly differ across the weeks.33 Nonetheless, many of the results
are significant in absolute terms. For spending, for all four weeks, many of the
marginal effects at intermediate horizons are significant. Thus the cumulative
effects become significant within a few months (for brevity, not reported). For
both payments and spending, and for all four weeks, the long-run cumulative
effects are statistically and economically significant (bottom of table A1), evenb 9
though they do not significantly differ across the weeks.34
The intermediate dynamics are qualitatively similar to those in table 2. For
33 To test for such differences, we created three indicator variables for accounts whose
rebates were disbursed in the first three weeks of the month (whether in July, August, or
September) and added them and their interactions with R and all its lags to eq. (1),
omitting the fourth week. (Note, however, that table A1 reports the implied total effects
for each group, not the differences relative to week 4.) For each week 1–3 and each of
spending and payments, the interaction terms are jointly insignificant. The interaction
terms are also jointly insignificant when considered jointly across all three weeks together,
for each of spending and payments.
34 While the initial responses of payments and spending can differ across early- vs. late-
in-the-month recipients, the long-run responses should not significantly differ. As just
noted, they do not. For comparison, distinguishing the week of receipt without imposing
the nonnegativity constraint yields substantially less precise results than in table A1:
(93), $15 (97), $63 (89), and $1 (91) for payments for weeks 1–4, respectively;b p $1229
(84), $9 (89), $115 (80), and $73 (82) for spending across weeks 1–4; andb p $1299
(93), $11 (99), $67 (91), and $69 (95) for debt across weeks 1–4. We also triedb p $319
constraining the marginal coefficients in table A1 to lie on a low-order polynomial, but
in general this did not help increase precision much.
TABLE A1
Consumer Response to Rebates: Intramonthly Analysis (N p 739,945)
Payments Spending
Coefficient Standard Error Coefficient Standard Error
Week 1:
b0 22.3 9.3** 9.1 7.7
b1 15.8 9.7* 15.4 9.1*
b2 30.1 10.3** 28.9 9.5**
b3 19.3 10.5* 27.5 10.2**
b4 26.6 11.1** 10.6 11.4
b5 23.9 11.6** 19.8 11.8*
b6 12.0 11.3 32.6 11.7**
b7 13.0 11.0 24.3 10.6**
b8 7.0 10.7 13.8 9.3
b9 29.3 13.8** 9.6 10.4
Week 2:
b0 18.0 10.7* .0 NA
b1 13.8 11.0 8.2 9.4
b2 9.9 11.2 .0 NA
b3 5.2 11.5 15.2 10.7
b4 15.0 12.2 25.0 12.4**
b5 9.0 12.5 21.8 12.3*
b6 24.7 13.0* 18.0 11.6
b7 .0 NA 13.9 10.3
b8 .0 NA .0 NA
b9 6.1 16.3 .0 NA
Week 3:
b0 2.6 8.3 1.3 7.7
b1 14.6 9.4 13.6 8.3*
b2 1.4 9.4 7.9 9.2
b3 19.7 10.1** 19.6 9.6**
b4 25.2 10.3** 22.8 10.5**
b5 10.2 10.6 17.5 11.2
b6 30.7 11.6** 33.3 11.4**
b7 17.2 11.0 19.7 10.3*
b8 8.0 10.4 26.4 9.5**
b9 7.9 12.2 11.0 10.5
Week 4:
b0 14.4 10.1 .0 NA
b1 18.1 10.6* 13.6 9.2
b2 14.7 10.7 7.0 10.4
b3 .0 NA 7.8 10.6
b4 6.0 10.7 24.0 11.8**
b5 .0 NA 22.6 13.0*
b6 .1 12.1 15.8 12.9
b7 10.3 12.6 27.5 12.3**
b8 21.7 12.9* 18.6 11.5
b9 6.8 12.0 12.1 10.1
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TABLE A1
(Continued)
Payments Spending
Coefficient Standard Error Coefficient Standard Error
Implied Long-Run Cumulative Effects b9
Week 1 199.4 60.6** 191.3 64.7**
Week 2 101.6 51.6** 102.2 40.9**
Week 3 137.4 59.2** 173.1 62.6**
Week 4 91.9 44.9** 149.0 62.4**
Test: {bs} joint significance .27 .60
Note.—This table reports the marginal effects bs depending on the week within the month the rebate was received.
Week 1 represents account holders who received their rebates in the first week of a month (whether July, August, or
September 2001), and week 4 represents rebates received in the last week. The specification adds to eq. (1) an indicator
variable for each week and its interaction with rebate receipt and its nine lags. The specification also includes a fullRt
set of month indicators. The marginal coefficients are constrained to be nonnegative, for all s. (The cases inb ≥ 0s
which the constraint binds are identified by NA in the standard errors column.) The reported p-values are from tests
of the joint significance of the marginal coefficients jointly across all four weeks combined. The standard errors{b }s
are adjusted for heteroscedasticity across accounts as well as serial correlation within accounts.
* Significantly different from zero at the 10 percent level.
** Significantly different from zero at the 5 percent level.
most of the weeks of receipt, the point estimates suggest that payments begin
to increase before spending (less so in week 3), but soon afterward spending
increases faster, such that the point estimates for for spending are generallyb 9
similar in size or larger than the estimates for payments. However, given theb 9
statistical uncertainty around the estimated ’s for spending and payments, oneb 9
cannot make from these results strong inferences about their implications for
the long-run change in debt, since the latter depends on the difference between
the former.
Appendix B
Balances on Other Credit Cards
Table B1 analyzes the response of the account holders’ other credit cards, using
the credit bureau data. Because the credit bureau data on other balances are
available only quarterly, we cannot identify the average response of these bal-
ances over time separately from month indicator variables.35 Nonetheless, we
can still examine whether, in any given month of data, the other balances are
larger for account holders who received their rebates earlier (i.e., in July and
August 2001) than for those who received their rebates later (in September
2001).
To interpret the results in the table, note that other balances are available in
four months of the sample (June, September, and December 2001 and March
2002), and the specification includes the corresponding month indicators. When
is omitted, the independent variable (or ) then measures how muchR R Rt t1 t2
larger or smaller are the balances in September 2001 of those who received
35 For example, since the rebates were disbursed in July, August, and September 2001,
in the credit bureau data from September 2001, the combination of , , andR R Rt t1 t2
would be collinear with a month indicator for September 2001.
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TABLE B1
Response across Other Credit Card Accounts (N p 204,747)
Other Balances Balances
Coefficient
Standard
Error Coefficient
Standard
Error
Ri,t1 9.1 128.7 13.2 30.0
Ri,t2 141.7 163.3 24.7 37.6
Ri,t4 148.3 138.3 12.3 31.3
Ri,t5 120.1 173.6 39.2 39.4
Ri,t7 167.0 152.0 41.5 32.8
Ri,t8 150.2 192.8 50.0 41.0
Test: joint{R }i,ts
significance .57 .81
Note.—Other balances are month-end balances on all other, nonsample credit cards held by the sample account
holders, using the quarterly credit bureau data. These data are available in June, September, and December 2001 and
March 2002. (The specification includes the corresponding month indicator variables.) For each month of data, the
coefficients on show whether other balances are larger or smaller for account holders who received their rebatesRts
earlier (in July and August 2001), relative to those who received their rebates later (in September 2001). See the text
for further discussion. The reported p-values are from tests of the joint significance of the lagged rebate indicators
. Balances represent month-end balances on the accounts in the main sample. For comparability,{R Fs p 1, 2, 4, 5, 7, 8}ts
this variable is used only in the same months for which other balances are available from the credit bureaus. The
standard errors are adjusted for heteroscedasticity across accounts as well as serial correlation within accounts.
their rebates in August (July) 2001, relative to the balances in September 2001
of those who received their rebates in September 2001. The resulting point
estimates for and are positive. This suggests that other balances in-R Rt1 t2
creased between the month of receipt and the next two months, though the
estimates are not statistically significant. Similarly, the point estimates for R t4
and , and for and , are also positive, suggesting that the balancesR R Rt5 t7 t8
of the earlier recipients remain higher through December 2001 and March
2002. However, these estimates are again insignificant, and jointly all the dif-
ferences together are also insignificant. Hence these{R Fs p 1, 2, 4, 5, 7, 8}ts
conclusions must be qualified.36 For comparison, table B1 applies the same
specification to the balances of the accounts in the main sample, using the data
only for the same four months for which other balances are available from the
credit bureaus. The results are qualitatively similar, with all the regressors R ts
being positive though insignificant. Hence, with the noted qualification, the
response of other credit cards appears if anything to reinforce (or at least not
to offset) the responses estimated above for the accounts in the main sample.
Appendix C
The Data
The main unit of analysis in the data is an individual credit card account. The
central account billing statement data (i.e., total payments and spending, and
debt) are available by cycle-month. Debt includes only interest-incurring bal-
36 Eventually the balances of all three groups of rebate recipients should converge.
However, as noted, the estimated differences between the groups are not significant even
in the short run. Also, these results do not pin down the overall level of balances and so
cannot rule out a decline in balances in the month of receipt ( ). Note, however,s p 0
that balances include both debt and transactions balances, so their behavior can differ
from that of debt.
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ances (i.e., balances rolled over into the next month), not transactions balances
(i.e., balances paid off).
The credit bureaus store their information by individual borrower. The credit
bureau data on other balances record total month-end balances across all other
credit cards held by the same account holder. This includes transactions bal-
ances: The credit bureaus do not separately record spending and debt. (For
additional discussion of credit bureau data, see, e.g., Musto and Souleles [2006].)
The issuer obtained the credit bureau data every three months. For consistency,
the usage ratio is defined as month-end balances on the account in the sample
divided by (other balances  $1), using the most recent credit bureau data on
other balances. If both the numerator and other balances in the denominator
of this ratio are zero or if balances are negative, the ratio is set to missing. In
table 3, if a variable used to split the sample is missing, the corresponding
observation is dropped from the corresponding regression.
The data set contains a representative sample of accounts open as of June
2000, with the following exclusions: (a) accounts that are bankrupt or two or
more months delinquent, or otherwise frozen; and (b) accounts that are dor-
mant/closed, including, for example, credit cards that were issued but never
activated. Consistently with the data provider’s standard practice given the avail-
able data fields, dormant/closed accounts were identified as those without any
retail activity in the previous three quarters.
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